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Abstract—Traceable sensor calibration constitutes a
foundational step that underpins operational safety in the
Industrial Internet of Things. Traceability is the property
that ensures reliability of sensed data by ensuring sensor
accuracy is within a small error margin of a highly-
accurate reference sensor. This is typically achieved via
a calibration infrastructure involving a long chain of
reference-calibration devices between the master reference
and the IoT sensor. While much attention has been given to
IoT security such as the use of TLS to secure sensed data,
little thought has been given to securing the calibration
infrastructure itself. Currently traceability is achieved via
manual verification using paper-based datasheets which is
both time consuming and insecure. For instance, when
the calibration status of parent devices is revoked as
mistakes or mischance is detected, calibrated devices
are not updated until the next calibration cycle, leaving
much of the calibration parameters invalid. Aside from
error, any party within the calibration infrastructure can
maliciously introduce errors since the current paper based
system lacks authentication as well as non-repudiation.
In this paper, we propose a novel resilient architecture
for calibration infrastructure, where the calibration status
of sensor elements can be verified on-the-fly to the root
of trust preserving the properties of authentication and
non-repudiation. We propose an implementation based on
smart contracts on the Ethereum network. Our evaluation
shows that Ethereum is likely to address the protection
requirements of traceable measurements.
I. INTRODUCTION
Connected robots are increasingly transforming
a wide range of application areas, including but
not limited to surgical suites [1] and industrial
processing plants [2]. The use of automation in
these areas brings forth the potential to increase
the efficiency of output, yet accuracy and precision
under adversarial pressure remains a constant worry.
In the context of surgical robotics, for example,
a high degree of accuracy and precision must be
maintained as accurate sensing could mean the
difference between life and death.
While a household IoT-alarm system typically
requires calibration at manufacturing time alone, a
high-assurance device such as a surgical robot [3]
involves much more work. A calibration infrastruc-
ture distributed across the OEM, several third-party
calibration agencies and suppliers involved in the
supply chain [4], [5] are part of the calibration work-
flow. The root of trust (calibration integrity) is a Na-
tional Measurement Institute (NMI) that maintains
the gold standards for sensing and measurment.
This is typically a government agency such as the
National Physical Laboratory (NPL) in UK or the
NIST in USA. The root of trust for each type of
sensor, consists of a master calibration device which
is used to calibrated other calibration units that serve
as a proxy for the master, and are in turn used to
keep calibration units closer to the field calibrated.
The field devices (such as the deployed robot) are
calibrated using the calibration units at the bottom
of the hierarchy, these are typically portable versions
of the master-proxy carried by calibration engineers
working for a third-party calibration agency.
As we start to rely on connected robots to per-
form critical tasks, we will start to see at least
three changes. First, the security of the calibration
infrastructure itself will start gaining importance
and mechanisms will be required to deal with the
obvious risks of fake calibration-engineers and fake
calibration devices.
Second, calibration correctness becomes a safety-
critical requirement. This means end-to-end mea-
surement and calibration traceability [6], [7], [8],
[9], [10], [11] at all times to ensure minimisation of
calibration errors and associated liabilities. Ensuring
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correctness of calibration in the face of malicious
actors, is crucial to address the operational resilience
requirements of connected systems. We argue that
the way ahead, is to ensure that all sensed data
is subject to verification via on-the-fly traceability
checks. This notion involves tracing sensed mea-
surements to the corresponding gold standard, by
involving all stakeholders: from the operator (e.g.
surgeon in a hospital), to the manufacturer and their
suppliers.
Third, how can the operator, regulator, manu-
facturer, and calibration agencies work together to
create a tamper-resistant trail of recorded activity to
aid system forensics, which can withstand hostile
scrutiny in a court of law when things go wrong?
There have been cases of lawsuits filed by pa-
tients, accusing hospitals of negligence over safety
considerations when surgical robots have inflicted
accidental injuries, and such are illustrative of the
significant liabilities and stakes involved when en-
suring robot safety.
II. BACKGROUND
To ensure measuring instruments provide high
quality and accurate measurements, we must ensure
that they are calibrated against a trustworthy source.
All measurements have a quantifiable degree of
uncertainty and the challenge is to ensure that we
can minimise this uncertainty, while maintaining a
quantifiable indication of the quality of measure-
ment. National standards for weights and measures
are maintained by National Measurement Institutes
(NMIs), such as the National Physical Laboratory
(NPL) in the United Kingdom. NMIs define national
measurement standards, which are associated with
values of uncertainty and are used to calibrate
measuring instruments.
The calibration of measuring instruments ensures
that recorded measurements are of high quality and
accuracy, such that they are compared to a standard
of higher accuracy to identify errors in instrument
readings. We calibrate to meet quality audit require-
ments and ensure reference designs, subsystems and
integrated systems perform as intended. A reliable
measurement should be recorded by instruments
with low measurement uncertainty and is traceable
to corresponding SI units, to a standard or reference
method [8]. Traceability is at the heart of measure-
ments and is a basis for comparisons against valid
measurements. A measurement’s metrological trace-
ability is its property, such that the measurement
result is related to a stated reference, through an un-
broken chain of calibrations [6]. Shown in Figure 1
are paths in a traceability chain. As demonstrated
by the diagram, each piece of end user equipment,
hereafter referred to as an end node, can be traced
back along the path to intermediary measurement
facilities and ultimately to NMIs — which refer to
the SI units as the basis for calibration. Each node
in a path, being a NMI or intermediary facility, can
branch out to other intermediary or end nodes, such
that each piece of equipment can be used to calibrate
a number of others.
Fig. 1: Traceability Chain Paths
Kaarls and Quinn state that a set of defined stan-
dard, or reference, methods can be created such that
primary method(s) are used to validate or calibrate
secondary or tertiary methods, which can be linked
to a working-level method [7]. The use of primary
methods are often time consuming and costly. A
trade-off for typical working-level methods induce
simplicity, but increases uncertainty. de Castro et
Al. state the measurement uncertainty is an oper-
ationally defined method of detailing the level of
confidence associated with a measurement [8], of-
fering advantages over other terms such as precision
and trueness.
III. PROTECTION REQUIREMENTS
Having noted that record-keeping around the
calibration process is a foundational challenge to
high-assurance IoT systems, several questions arise.
What new security problems and what protection
opportunities arise where the typical factory may
have upwards of a 100,000 sensors, and thousands
of such factories or labs share a few hundred
calibration facilities. Clearly a future calibration
framework will have to ensure good separation
between rivals while also supporting dependable
shared channels to ensure traceability chains back
to a root calibration unit. If some of the calibration
units are left on client facilities then are themselves
susceptible to occasional compromise.
Current calibration assumes that all actors will
behave themselves are thought to require little se-
curity. However just like early security protocols
has to evolve under adversarial pressure, so too will
calibration frameworks that have been traditionally
thought to require little attention, have to change
as we move towards the dynamic case — internet-
connected devices that are compromised by malware
and other attacks will require frequent and full resets
of all prior state including calibration information.
If the manufacturing facility comes under a targeted
attack, engineers will have to design calibration
frameworks that can deal with a stream of devices
being added and compromised.
Scale is another important factor that designers
must consider. As we move from the current deploy-
ment of networks involving a few connected sensors
to larger networks with hundreds of thousands of
sensors, we will need to assume that a fraction of the
sensors will be compromised by insiders. Indeed the
threat is no longer restricted to outside the facility.
We argue that the threat model must assume that
the devices to be calibrated may be physically com-
promised, whilst being subjected to attacks arising
from the combination of old software on newly-
connected devices resulting in their software being
tampered and therefore a fraction of the devices
are rendered unsafe for use at any given point of
time. Some calibration units especially those near
the bottom of the hierarchy may also be compro-
mised. The communication channels between vari-
ous components of the calibration hierarchy will be
subjected to the same attacks resulting in a fraction
of compromised channels.
While the use of security techniques such as
authentication and transport security are obvious,
experience suggests that the likely challenges are
going to be in key generation, distribution, up-
date, and revocation. The foundational requirement
is an authentication mechanism that establishes a
rigourous mantle upon which the rest of the cal-
ibration record-keeping can be mounted. In addi-
tion to the authentication infrastructure, a resilient
monitoring mechanism is a key requirement, which
will alert operators and take steps to isolate rogue
calibration units and end-devices.
The scale and complexity are significant. While
conventional calibration techniques involve manual
record keeping, a broad range of data can be moni-
tored: we can query an instrument, other instruments
in its vicinity, and their controllers; and we can
also launch data plane probes to cross-check. With
a large corpus of live and historical network data,
the operator can make better decisions when under
attack.
A. Threat model
The current verification process for calibration
information has no associated threat model and
thus to enable the need for digitisation, a sound
threat model is the first step towards resilience. We
believe there are at least four types of threats to the
calibration infrastructure.
Large-scale compromise: First, an intentional at-
tack by a state or state-sponsored group could dis-
cover systemic weaknesses that compromises a large
fraction of the calibration infrastructure. These vul-
nerabilities could be exploited by a capable attacker
resulting in seeding significant confusion in the best
case. And, in the worst-case scenario, entire batches
of a production-cycle might be compromised such
as a whole batch of wrongly proportioned paraceta-
mol landing up on a supermarket shelf.
Behavioural economics: Second, as the digital
calibration infrastructure develops into hierarchical
trees of substantial size with millions of participants,
complex behaviours may arise as a result of system
economics. For instance, selfish behaviours may
manifest that optimises the costs of a fraction of
the participant at the expense of the rest of the
calibration ecosystem.
Flying debris: Third, secondary impacts of at-
tacks directed at other targets may damage the
calibration infrastructure. For example, a DoS attack
may cause verification to fail if the network is
shared with other systems leading. If verification
is substantially delayed, it could make instruments
uncontrollable triggering a precautionary shutdown.
Insider threat: Fourth, an insider may sabotage
the calibration infrastructure. Although insiders are
a persistent threat who may execute traditional phys-
ical attacks, cyber-security vulnerabilities give extra
opportunities to damage assets.
B. Security policy
Following the threat model, the next step is to
develop a security policy for the calibration system.
A security policy is a succinct description of infor-
mation flow constraints that stipulates the protection
requirements to be met by security mechanisms, in
order to mitigate the threats outlined in the threat
model. Information flow controls are important.
A move from the current peer-to-peer architecture
underlying calibration devices and field instruments,
any of which will cause havoc if compromised, can
bring real benefits. The natural hierarchy within the
calibration infrastructure when composed with in-
formation flow controls can compartmentalise risk,
thus the compromise of a few units will do no more
than local damage.
We argue that the appropriate information flow
control for a calibration system is multi-level in-
tegrity, with root-calibration units calibrated by pri-
mary methods and references at the upper levels,
field devices calibrated by secondary methods and
references at the middle levels, and working level
methods, references, and end-user equipment situ-
ated at the bottom. Also known as the BIBA model,
this is similar to multi-level security systems typi-
cally used by government systems to enforce confi-
dentiality by allowing information to flow from low-
confidentiality to high-confidentiality levels (Eg.
Top-secret to Secret to Confidential to Unclassified).
The proposed security architecture for sensor
and device calibration is as illustrated in Figure 2,
has upper levels which consists of root-calibration
units operated and managed by NMIs such as the
National Physical Laboratory, each of which cal-
ibrate and manage the accuracy of tens of level
1 calibration devices, and each level 1 device in
turn manages a few thousand level 2 calibration
devices, each of which manage the calibration of
tens of thousands of field level instruments. By
coupling the calibration hierarchy with information-
flow constraints, we can organise the measurement
infrastructure so that only the compromise of top-
Fig. 2: Secure Calibration Architecture
level calibration devices can cause erroneous mea-
surement at scale, thus reducing the number of
critical components at least by a factor of hundred.
Furthermore, with the use of appropriate controls
at level 2, the compromise of a level 2 calibration
device does little damage outside of its first-hop
neighbours, then we can arrange to further reduce
the sites of critical failure by another factor of ten.
The calibration hierarchy can be readily extended,
without much imagination, to map the hierarchical
levels to local calibration components within a man-
ufacturing environment.
We assume the root (level 0) and level 1 cali-
bration devices can (rarely) suffer accidental con-
figuration errors but are otherwise trustworthy. On
the other hand, level 2 calibration devices may
suffer occasional compromise and, as previously
mentioned, a fraction of field instruments may be
compromised at any one time which might misbe-
have, intentionally or otherwise.
C. Calibration levels and Measurement levels
We expect that most of the calibration work
will be carried out by one or more middle levels
consisting of mid-level calibration devices and cal-
ibrated field instruments that exist in the middle
level. Level 1 and 2 organisations generally use
master calibration units to calibrate other devices.
This allows other calibration devices to be calibrated
locally, reducing the time and cost for calibrating at
level 0, as only the master unit needs to be sent to
the level 0 organisation. Field devices are sent to
level 1 and 2 organisations for calibration.
On the other hand, all the measurement work will
be carried out by the field devices located at the
bottom (leaf position) of the hierarchy.
Let them out, but not in: As previously described,
any close-to-field calibration devices and field in-
struments may become a point of compromise at
any one time, causing them to misbehave, inten-
tionally or otherwise. A newly established network
architecture, to define and constrain the behaviours
— whether malicious or legitimate — of field
instruments and close-to-field calibration devices,
could invoke the use of refusing incoming con-
nections and only allowing outgoing connections.
Field instruments and close-to-field devices will be
primarily used to transmit outgoing data and not
receive incoming data.
Enforcing non-repudiation: As well as constrain-
ing the behaviour of field instruments and close-
to-field devices, a discussion of mitigating possible
compromise is necessary. An important point for
mitigation is to ensure that instruments and devices
are accountable for transmitted data, such as mea-
surements field instruments may take and results
from calibration units. The data should be recorded
such that it can be traced back to the unit itself.
This aids in the isolation of a device in the event of
compromise.
Access granted: Across factory premises and
different sites, what shared and private states are
practical to hold and will any limitations be imposed
as a result of state? A suitable access control policy
should be defined such that calibration information
can be made public by default, with organisations
enabling an option to not publicly display this if they
consider the information to be private. However,
the discussion of privatising calibration information
imposes a degree of difficulty on enabling the
traceability of measurements associated with the
privatised information. Therefore, to aid in reducing
the difficulty of this process, the calibration frame-
work could support an anonymised base system
which also allows revocation. A set of scopes can
be defined for the nodes in the traceability chain
as shown in Figure 1, which determine the access
constraints for data contained within the scope,
whilst a general access policy can be used to cover
data in a general scope.
D. Monitoring
Monitoring is a logical service in the network.
The purpose of monitoring is to collect statistics
from both calibration and measurement levels. Mon-
itoring makes available its information to relevant
users and operators so they can watch and intervene
if needed. This service can perform both passive
and active monitoring. Passively, it can measure
statistics such as the number of measurements that
match a certain pattern, the extent of traceability
up the calibration hierarchy, or per-instrument error
margins. Actively, it can interrogate a field instru-
ment by sending a measurement request and observe
the the instrument output. Monitoring also exposes a
new level of control to the calibration infrastructure.
The potential of using this for auditing and informa-
tion flow analysis is immense. Among others, this
makes available an interesting potential for tackling
malware outbreaks as well as adapting and reacting
to other forms of network attacks. The monitoring
level also feeds data back into the measurement
level.
E. Protection mechanism
To achieve the protection requirements described
in the previous section, it is natural to consider the
use of a blockchain as a solution. In accordance
with our protection requirements for maintaining
high integrity, the nature of a blockchain structure
is ready to accomplish such. Through the use of
strong cryptographic links among blocks, as well as
a distributed network for storage and consensus, it
would be extremely hard to tamper with or delete
data from the blockchain. This not only aids in
fulfilling our integrity requirement, but also enforces
non-repudiation. Since the blockchain is a ledger,
keeping records of all transactions, we can ensure
that devices cannot deny interactions or data pro-
duction, and can thus be held accountable for their
actions.
Although the blockchain is definitely impressive
in terms of fulfilling our requirements thus far, we
must consider what will be stored on the blockchain
to aid with functions such as verifying the com-
pleteness of traceability chains in order to accept
valid measurements, as well as providing a way to
trace measurements back to field devices. From the
calibration hierarchy, we know that all devices and
units are associated with a calibration report, which
outlines information about parent calibration units,
operating ranges with a measurement uncertainty
(MU), among other things. Figure 3 depicts an
example calibration report. As well as this, the
report will also detail the calibration technician
who performed the calibration on the device or
unit. Therefore, for completeness, storing reports as
well as technicians on the chain is ideal. This will
enable the contract to verify the calibration status
of each device by looking up its associated parent
unit(s), to trace upwards to the master calibration
device (root) unit. The result is written to the chain,
which enables the device user to check whether
the device is calibrated against the root units that
establish the gold standard. The use of ECDSA
signatures prevents an adversary from forging cal-
ibration reports into the blockchain (explained in
detail below). Also, to prevent the unauthorised use
of valid calibration devices, the traceability-check
contract verifies the signature of technicians all
along the calibration hierarchy. A valid technician’s
signing keys must be signed by the calibration
organisation’s root signing key, and in turn signed
by the NMI, which is the root of trust.
Fig. 3: Example Calibration Report
Considering the trace back to the calibration tech-
nician, we would also want to know what organisa-
tion certified the technician to perform calibration,
and therefore we must also store the organisations
in the calibration hierarchy, to allow for complete
audit trails in the event of disaster which stems from
invalid or improper calibration.
Now that we have established what will be stored
on the chain, we must understand how we can use
the blockchain for traceability verification checks.
Popular implementations, such as Ethereum, use
smart contracts to execute code and interact directly
with the blockchain. To perform traceability ver-
ification, within a secure boot process (i.e. when
the sensor starts up), we can use a smart contract.
The smart contract will execute code that will verify
whether or not there is a complete traceability chain,
with each unit in the chain having valid calibration,
before the sensor is allowed to start capturing data
(Figure 4).
Algorithm 1 Trace Creation
1: procedure TRACECAL WRITE(device id)
2: . Get certifying organisation of device
3: org name = getCertifyingOrg(reports[
TraceCal READ(device id)].device id)
4: if org name == NPL then
5: . Set the trace to valid
6: traces[device id].device id = device id
7: traces[device id].trace complete = true
8: traces[device id].valid report = true
9: else
10: . Trace is invalid
11: traces[device id].device id = device id
12: traces[device id].trace complete = true
13: traces[device id].valid report = false
14: end if
15: end procedure
Fig. 4: Sensor Traceability Verification using a
Smart Contract
Specifically, the contract will take the sensor’s
device ID as input to the smart contract, which
will execute a function to verify it has complete
traceability, as described in Algorithm 1. The al-
gorithm will use another function to retrieve the
root (calibration) report of the device’s traceability
chain, which retrieves the parent report from the
chain, verifies signatures, and loops until there are
no parents (Algorithm 2). It will then check the final
device’s certifying organisation to see if it is an
NMI, in our case NPL, and if so, the traceability
chain is valid and complete, and thus return a
verified result to the device. Likewise, if there is no
NMI root, the trace will complete but will return
a non-verified result to the device. Furthermore, to
retrieve a certificate itself, the smart contract will
interact with the PKI system (depicted in Figure 2)
to retrieve the certificate. In the algorithm, the sig-
natures will be verified before accepting the parent
identifier. The public key of the technician who
calibrated the device is not that of the one who
signed the parent, then the verification will fail and
return a null result (ultimately resulting in invalid
traceability), and otherwise will continue looping
until the NMI root.
Algorithm 2 Trace Verification
1: procedure TRACECAL READ(device id)
2: device report = reports[device id]
3: parent cert = certificates[device report.parent id]
4: technician cert =
certificates[device report.technician id]
5: . If report is not signed by parent device, then fail
6: if !(key verify(device report, parent cert)) then
7: return null
8: end if
9: . If report is not signed by technician, then fail
10: if !(key verify(device report, technician cert) then
11: return null
12: end if
13: org cert = certificates[technician cert.org id]
14: if verify signature(technician cert, org cert) ==
false then
15: return null
16: end if
17: if check chain of trust(org cert, ROOT CERT ) ==
false then
18: return null
19: end if
20: . Report now verified, now verify there is a root
21: root report id = device id
22: parent = reports[root report id].parent device
23: . Loop until there is no parent
24: while bytes(parent).length > 0 do
25: . Verify parent report is signed by parent device
26: if key verify(parent,
27: certificates[parent].parent device) then
28: if key verify(parent, technician cert) then
29: root report id = parent
30: parent =
reports[root report id].parent device
31: else
32: return null
33: end if
34: else
35: return null
36: end if
37: end while
38: return reports[root report id]
39: end procedure
Upon calibration, the device will be imprinted
with a ECDSA public and private keypair, which
are signed by the certified technician, establishing
a chain of trust. The technician’s keys used to
sign the device’s calibration report and are in turn
signed by the organisation’s keys who certified the
technician (Figure 5), such that we can verify that
the technicians themselves are not fake.
Fig. 5: Signing Calibration Certificates
Certified calibration organisations will be asso-
ciated with their own keypair, which will be used
to sign all calibration technician keys they wish to
certify.
IV. EVALUATION
In order to better understand the natural con-
sideration of blockchains as a solution to fulfil
our protection requirements, we must evaluate an
implementation that can verify the completeness of
traceability chains at any stage in the calibration
hierarchy.
A. Blockchain Environment
For our blockchain implementation we used the
Ethereum blockchain [12], a Turing-complete, de-
centralised value-transfer system which facilitates
the use of smart contracts, written in Solidity,
to interact with the blockchain. The programming
language in Ethereum is implemented as a set of
140 opcodes which all nodes execute determin-
istically. The opcodes are condensed to form a
bytecode string which can be published on the
network, in the form of a smart contract. During
deployment, a transaction is created by the account
deploying the contract, and the contract is given
its own unique address. When this transaction is
accepted, the smart contract persists in the network.
The contract may have various functions, and can
also allocate persistent memory on the network.
Any account which wants to interact with it uses
the contract’s address to call its various functions.
The contract may contain two types of functions,
including transactions and calls. Transactions are
those which modify the persistent memory of the
contract. They are called transactions specifically
because they need to be run by all nodes to ensure
synchronicity, and thus cost computational power.
Calls merely read the persistent memory and can be
run locally as well, and hence are free of cost. Since
each transaction function requires computational
resources based on the bytecode executed, there
must be a way to charge each operation. Thus, every
opcode is assigned a fixed cost which was tabulated
when the network was deployed, and this cost is
measured by units of gas.
Blockchain technology was proposed as an al-
ternative to a centralized trusted authority to store
sensitive information. Instead, a peer to peer net-
work of nodes would independently maintain the
entire database, with cryptographic algorithms used
to secure the data. Each node receives transactions
in a different order. All transactions received within
a certain time frame need to be aggregated into a
new block. But to ensure that the data in every
block is consistent across all nodes, a voting scheme
is used, which is called mining. Instead of having
a direct vote, a proof-of-work model is used to
determine which node wins the vote to determine
the next accepted block. Each node first aggregates
a limited number of transactions, and then solves an
NP cryptographic problem. This problem has been
formulated such that any random node may stumble
upon the solution, but the entire network will solve
the problem given a certain amount of time, which
is determined by the block difficulty.
To provide an incentive for nodes to behave
honestly, an incentive system is needed so that each
node processes the transactions it receives into the
next block. Hence each transaction also has an
associated transaction fee which is paid to the node
that mines the block which includes the transaction.
Thus, each node is incentivized to solve as many
blocks as possible. This also has the additional
effect on the nodes causing them to balance their
workload between mining a block and processing
transactions. The time to mine a block is set by
adjusting the block difficulty, while the transaction
processing time is limited by the transaction limit.
In case of simple transactions like in bitcoin, the
transaction limit is enforced by the total number of
transactions. But in Ethereum, the transaction varies
based on the cost (gas) of the transaction [12]. As
mentioned before, in case of Ethereum, each trans-
action basically consists of performing certain fixed
operations defined by the smart contract, and finally
modifying the persistent data on the blockchain.
Instead of keeping the transaction limit as a simple
multiple of transactions, the total cost is instead
the sum of cost of each individual transaction. This
limit ensures that the total computational resources
used by the node to process all transactions remains
below a fixed value. Thus, even if the sum of cost
of all transactions exceeds the limit, the limit is
determined in such a way that the time each node
takes to process a transaction is far lesser than
the time allocated to solve for proof-of-work. This
ensures that any transaction whose cost is less than
the block limit will be executed in a single block
itself, making its round time equal to the block
processing time, regardless of the cost of the actual
transaction.
1) Smart Contracts: The purpose of our smart
contract is to define the functions of our protection
mechanism, described in Section III-E, to interact
with the blockchain to read and write data. In our
smart contract, we defined functions for declaring
aspects of the calibration hierarchy, as well as those
for traceability verification. Specifically, we defined
functions for creating and retrieving calibration
organisations, certified calibration technicians and
calibration reports, as well as creating traceability
chains (traces) and verifying them. Table I describes
the primary functions within our smart contract.
Smart contracts were deployed and tested on private
Ethereum blockchain (Ganache) as well as public
Testnet (Ropsten Testnet) with the help of truffle
testing framework [13]. An interesting fact is that
the gas usage is exactly same whether the smart
contract is deployed on the Ethereum Test Net (Rop-
sten) or a private Net (Ganache). After deployment
of the smart contracts we measured the gas usage of
each function as well as the transaction confirmation
times.
2) Calibration Hierarchy and Traceability: To
meet the definition of our protection mechanism,
the smart contract should effectively be able to
create the calibration hierarchy as well as provide
methods to verify the metrological traceability of
a given device or calibration unit. As previously
described, we define functions to create calibration
organisations and certified calibration technicians
who will oversee and perform calibration of these
devices, as well as providing two distinct functions:
TraceCal WRITE and TraceCal READ to create
and verify (read) traceability chains. These functions
are described in detail in Algorithms 1 and 2,
respectively.
3) Ropsten Test Network: In order to properly
evaluate how our protection mechanism performs in
a realistic environment, we deployed our implemen-
tation on the Ropsten test network [14]. Also known
as the Ethereum Testnet, the Ropsten test network is
the largest Ethereum test network and runs the same
proof-of-work (PoW) protocol as Ethereum, but is
designed for testing smart contracts before deploy-
ing them on the main Ethereum network. It uses
a form of Ether, Ethereum’s currency, called rEth
which costs no real money. However, this can also
be produced from Mining and can be received from
faucets for testing transactions without imposing a
legitimate cost.
In comparison with other Ethereum testnets such
as Kovan [15] or Rinkeby [16], which use an
alternative Proof-of-Authority (PoA) consensus pro-
tocol and have lower block confirmation times,
the PoW Ropsten testnet best reproduces the cur-
rent Ethereum production environment conditions
and is useful for testing our protection mechanism
against realistic transaction rates/times, number of
nodes/miners, and gas prices, compared to those on
the main Ethereum network.
B. Functionality Testing
The aim of our first set of experiments was to
determine whether or not our protection mechanism
functions as intended. Specifically, our functions to
set up organisations, technicians and calibration-
reports must properly create their respective objects,
with the appropriate input parameters, and raise
errors when these parameters are invalid.
1) Creating organisations, technicians and re-
ports: When our smart contract is executed, we
instantiate the calibration hierarchy with NPL as
the root NMI organisation. From this, we tested
creating organisations, with each certifying several
technicians. These were created using the create-
Organisation and createTechnician functions. These
technicians would then go on to calibrate field
devices and calibration units, which produces a
calibration report upon completion of calibration;
which ultimately need to be placed on the chain. To
create a report, we use the createReport function in
the smart contract. As expected, all our tests were
successful, with the appropriate objects created on
the chain. Appropriately, we also defined functions
for data retrieval, such as getTechnicianOrganisa-
tion which gets the certifying organisation of a
technician, for which all tests returned expected
results.
2) Creating and verifying traces: Once we had
confirmed that organisations, technicians and cali-
bration reports were created and stored on the chain
successfully, we developed functions for creating
traceability chains, hereafter referred to as traces.
For valid traces, a device or unit must have a series
of antecedent parent units which ends at an NMI
root, in our case NPL. The TraceCal WRITE() func-
tion in our smart contract is used to check that there
is a root report and that the certified technician who
completed the trace is at the NMI root. The details
of this algorithm are described in Algorithm 1. For
devices that have a valid trace, the result should
display that it has a valid calibration report, and
invalid for those that do not have a valid trace.
The result is then written to the chain, confirming
that there is a valid/invalid trace corresponding to a
particular device. Our unit tests for creating traces
were successful in meeting our expected results.
C. Scalability Testing
For our next set of tests, we must evaluate how
our protection mechanism scales with the ubiquitous
nature and vast size of the calibration hierarchy. As
well as this, we also evaluated how the addition
of signatures, used for signing calibration reports
(among others as described in Section III-E), affects
how well our protection mechanism scales. The
following tests which involve contract executing
times have been run on a local blockchain using
Ganache as the provider, and the Remix IDE to
run the contract calls. We use Ganache to get the
contract executing time as the contract is executed
immediately, whereas on the main Ethereum net-
work other contracts may be executed in the same
block and measuring the execution time would be
Function Description
createOrganisation Accepts an ID and a name, and creates an organisation on the blockchain
createTechnician Requests an Ethereum address and an organisation id, and will create a technician on the
blockchain
createReport Accepts a number of parameters, such as the device id and technician id, and creates a
calibration-report object on the blockchain
TraceCal WRITE Checks traceability for a specific device by checking if the technician who completed it is
an NMI and writes the result to the chain.
TraceCal READ Accepts a device ID and returns a root calibration-report if it has one, else returns the
calibration-report of the device itself.
getParentReport Accepts a device and returns its direct parent’s calibration-report or NULL.
getOrgName Accepts an organisation ID and returns the name of the organisation
getTechnicianOrganisation Returns the organisation ID of the organisation who certified the technician
TABLE I: List of Implementation Functions
difficult. Likewise, we measured gas cost in the
following experiments using the Ropsten network
as Ganache provides an environment for testing
contracts without costs, whereas Ropsten imposes
gas and Ether costs like the main network but for
free.
1) Impact of #Devices on Execution Time for
Traces: For our first set of experiments, we mea-
sured the impact the number of devices in the
calibration hierarchy has on the execution time
of the smart contract for traceability verification.
Firstly, to match the calibration hierarchy, we used
varying numbers of field devices n as a baseline.
From this, we deduce the number of levels as
log(n), such that if we have 100 field devices, the
calibration hierarchy will consist of two levels as
well as the root NMI. Furthermore, we map the
number of organisations in the calibration hierarchy
as log2(n− 1), such that for 100 field devices there
will be 4 organisations.
Next, we define the scope of our first set of
experiments for n in the range 10 ≤ n ≤ 106.
As shown in Figure 6a, we observed the effect
of n field devices on the contract execution time
for creating (write) and verifying (read) traces.
We observed that as the number of field devices
and levels increase, the time for verifying traces
increases. Similarly, the execution time for creating
traces also increases with levels. In comparison with
the verification times, creation times are at least
0.2 seconds more, as creating the traces involves
retrieving the root calibration report and certificate,
which our verification function uses as well.
Furthermore, we also observed the impact of
adding signatures in our protection mechanism. For
verification, the addition of signatures in the ver-
ification of traces more than doubles the contract
execution time. Similarly, we also notice a similar
increase in execution time for trace creation with
signatures. Although this may seem a lot, if we con-
sider the case of 1, 000, 000 devices, the execution
times are still only just over a single second. If we
compare these times to what we would expect from
the paper-based current state-of-the-art, they are an
extremely significant improvement.
2) Impact of #Devices on Gas Cost for Traces:
Using the Ethereum blockchain only imposes a gas
cost when writing transactions and not reading from
the blockchain. Based on this, it is interesting to
observe how the imposed gas cost correlates with
the number of devices (levels and organised further
deduced from this). Observing the results from this
experiment, depicted in Figure 6b, we can see that
the gas cost increases linearly. However, this linear
increase is relatively smaller in comparison to the
increase in gas costs when we add signatures. Since
gas costs correlate with the effort required to execute
the smart contracts, our results suggest that the
addition of signatures increase the effort required
to execute the contract function.
In addition to gas costs, if we compare these
results with those of the previous experiment, we
observe that there is a correlation between execution
time and gas cost. This relationship suggests that
gas costs increases with contract execution time, and
ultimately the amount of effort required to execute
the contract.
As a point of further comparison, we also evalu-
(a) Impact of # Devices on Execution Time
(b) Impact of # Devices on Gas Cost
Fig. 6: Impact of # Devices on Execution Time and
Gas Cost
ated the contract execution times and gas consumed
for the other creation functions in our smart con-
tract, specifically: createOrganisation, createTechni-
cian and createReport. From the results in Table II,
we can see that the completion time for these func-
tions is relatively low compared to creating traces.
This is because our trace creation function which
includes looping antecedent levels of the hierarchy
to reach the root, and verifying the calibration tech-
nician. With the addition of signatures, we notice
that the completion time increases by roughly 0.3s
in each case. Similarly with the creation of traces,
the effort required to execute contracts with the
addition of signatures increases, and thus the gas
cost increases as well.
3) Impact of #Levels on Execution Time and Gas
Cost: In our previous experiments, we derived the
Function Completion Time (s) Gas ConsumedNo Sig Sig No Sig Sig
createOrganisation() 0.5 0.84 87,282 172,890
createTechnician() 0.23 0.54 66,374 152,447
createReport() 0.43 0.80 114,095 293,771
TABLE II: Completion Time and Gas Costs for
Creation Functions
number of levels based on the number of field de-
vices, n, as the primary variable. Realistically, there
may be more than log(n) levels, and it is interesting
to evaluate how the number of levels impacts the
execution time and gas cost. In this experiment, we
measured the impact of the number of levels on
execution times for creating and verifying traces,
as well as the imposed gas cost on the creation of
traces (as gas does not apply to reads). As shown
in the results of this experiment in Figure 7a, the
contract execution time increases in all cases as the
number of levels increases. As both the creation
and verification functions require reaching the root
certificate, the time spent for both functions will
increase as the number of antecedent units in a
device’s trace also increases.
Noticeably, the gas cost increases relatively lin-
early as shown in Figure 7b, which is similar to
the results shown in Figure 6b, where an increasing
number of devices also increases the gas consumed.
Since the increase is linear, there is no significant
impact on gas consumption due to the number of
levels (nor devices). With the addition of signatures,
the increase in gas cost is still linear, which shows
that the number of levels still has no impact on
gas cost, but the addition of signatures increases
the effort required to execute the contract and such
increases the gas cost. With respect to contract
execution time, the addition of signatures seems to
have little impact with a small number of levels,
but increases significantly as the number of levels
increase, taking around 7 seconds to create traces at
50 levels.
4) Impact of #Levels on Mining Time: Aside
from the impact the number of levels has on in-
creasing contract execution times and gas costs, it
is interesting to consider the impact on mining time.
When transactions are written, they are added to a
list of recent transactions known as a block. This
(a) Impact of # Levels on Execution Time
(b) Impact of # Levels on Gas Cost
Fig. 7: Impact of # Levels on Execution Time and
Gas Cost
block will be added to the chain once verified by
miners (proof of work), and thus there is a time
for the miners to verify the transaction. Unlike
using Ganache to measure the execution times,
we used the Ropsten test network to measure the
mining time. This is because there is no mining
involved in the local Ganache Ethereum blockchain.
As shown in Figure 8, the mining times fluctuate as
we increase the number of levels with its lowest just
under 20 seconds and near 140 seconds at its worst.
This shows that there is no clear correlation between
the number of levels and mining times, and thus
we deduce that this factor is irrelevant to consider.
Furthermore, due to there being no clear correlation,
we did not find it reasonable to evaluate the impact
of added signatures on mining time.
Fig. 8: Impact of Number of Levels on Mining Time
for Trace Creation
5) Impact of #Traces Per Day: For our final
experiment, we wanted to calculate the gas usage
per day, in the event of traces being crated multiple
times. In our experiments, we noticed that the
number of organisations did not have an impact on
completion time or the gas cost imposed. Thus, if
we had to run trace creations once an hour per
day (M = 24), the time taken to complete the
function should be consistent for one device at a
particular level. The gas cost, however, will vary as
it is measured as a quantity of runs. In our tests,
we found that for level 3 devices 81, 241 units of
gas were consumed, and for level 6 devices it costs
84, 992 units. Furthermore, with the addition of
signatures, the gas costs increased by over 100, 000
units in both cases, with 200, 126 gas consumed for
level 3 devices, and 322, 942 units consumed for
level 6 devices.
From these results, we experimented with the
impact on the number of trace creations per day,
on the gas consumed, for devices at level 3 and
6. As shown in Figure 9, we observed that the
gas costs increase exponentially with the number of
trace verifications per day. In the worst case of our
tests, with 24 verifications per day (i.e. 1 per hour),
roughly 15.5m gas units were consumed. Usually,
we will perform a trace verification during secure
boot and as such, only a small number of gas units
are consumed. With the addition of signatures, we
notice a larger exponential increase, but a relatively
Fig. 9: Impact of Number of Trace Creations on Gas
Usage Per Day
similar gas consumption at a single trace verification
per day.
V. DISCUSSION
As we start to use connected devices to perform
critical tasks, such as performing surgical proce-
dures on humans or other high assurance activities,
ensuring that the system can operate safely whilst
being robust to attacks is important. Additionally,
we also require a strong tamper-resistant trail of
recorded activity to enable system forensics that will
withstand hostile scrutiny in a court of law. Indeed
operational safety breakdowns resulting in injury to
humans working alongside connected collaboration-
robots (cobots) has been the subject of much litiga-
tion. These cases are illustrative of the significant li-
abilities involved and the stakes involved in ensuring
safety within Industrial IoT settings. It is natural to
pursue the development of safety assurance system
that can provide data traceability, support decision
forensics, and manage measurement uncertainty.
Our evaluation shows that the contract execution
time for traceability verification has a linear increase
in cost with the number of levels. Realistically
though, the time required for contract execution will
depend on the dynamics of miner availability and
competing transactions. Further, the time required
for the PoW scheme is two orders of magnitude
(tens to hundreds of seconds) larger than the aver-
age verification time (a few hundred ms). As the
most significant of all costs involved, mining time
plays a crucial role given its variance. We note
however, that this is primarily due to the widely
acknowledged inefficiency of the PoW scheme used
currently by Ethereum. In due course, it is expected
that other mainstream blockchain technologies will
be available, that utilise other consensus approaches
that enable scaling of the mining process and with
higher efficiency. We have therefore computed the
time consumed for contract execution, separate from
mining and block confirmation times, with emphasis
on contract execution. Based on our scalability tests
it is clear that contract execution scales rather well,
and the inefficiency of mining is a significant barrier
to the frequency of on-the-fly calibration checks that
an IoT device can afford.
A. Limitations and Future Work
Parallelism: The Ethereum blockchain network
was conceived as a cryptographically secure and
decentralized database, with the capability to not
only store data, but also execute Turing complete
code, allowing the network to function as a secure
virtual machine. The blockchain concept is merely
a mechanism to facilitate orderly updates to the
data stored on the virtual machine (so that there is
no temporal ambiguity), and to ensure consensus
among all stakeholders. Each block is just a set
of update calls organised on the basis of their
time of arrival to the processing node, and since
there is a possibility of dependence across certain
transactions which arrive one after another, all trans-
actions must be processed serially. Parallelism can
only be incorporated across separate address spaces,
in which case transactions cannot directly access
data stored in different segments. The concept of
sharding is based on this model of splitting the
database into independent chunks, and may be
incorporated into future blockchain networks. The
current algorithm requires modifications if it must
benefit from sharding, because currently, each entity
(device/technician/organization) is logically linked
in the form of a tree.
# Supported devices: The Ethereum network cur-
rently prescribes that each block may only contain
transactions whose total gas cost amounts to 8
million at maximum. This is not only a result of
performance and financial considerations on the part
of the nodes, but the need to minimize the compu-
tation required by non-nodes with low computing
power to validate blocks as well. As reported in the
evaluation, the gas cost of traceability-verification
(write) [?], is around 200, 000 gwei per execution.
For reference, wei is the smallest denomination of
Ether, with 109 wei equal to a single gwei, and 1018
wei making up one Ether. Thus assuming a (rather
strict) regime of hourly calibration verification, the
cost is approximately 4 million gwei per device.
This means only 2 devices can be validated per
block, assuming that the system has access to the
entire global bandwidth. Another important consid-
eration is the average block mining time. This was
rationalized not only based on monetary constraints,
but also based on studies conducted which mea-
sured the time taken for mined blocks to propagate
throughout a blockchain network. Currently, the
average mining time for Ethereum is around 15 sec-
onds. This considerably limits the number of fully
harmonised traceability-verification (write) requests
to 11, 520 per day. As the total system bandwidth for
traceability-verification (write) is 11, 520 requests
per day, this is a key limitation that future work can
focus on (there is no limit on read-only traceability
verification).
Future work: To decrease the gas cost (for write
operations), we can exploit the fact that our al-
gorithm is built on a hierarchical model of trust
(which flows from the NMIs towards field de-
vices). We can leverage this to reduce the costs
of traceability-writes. We can also introduce block
validators – trusted entities in our hierarchy — to
validate blocks offline and write the correct result
onto the blockchain. Furthermore, a byzantinian
fault tolerant (BFT) mechanism can be incorporated
among the block validators. This will ensure that the
write costs will be independent of the computational
complexity of traceability verification (read only) 2
algorithm, while maintaining security.
VI. CONCLUSION
An open challenge within industrial IoT processes
is maintaining the integrity of calibration under
adversarial pressure. Whilst there are many factors
which contribute to this, including software patches
to secure data storage, an important foundational
requirement is to secure the calibration mechanism
itself. In particular, the need for a mechanism that
is: highly available, verifiable and tamper-resistant,
for verifying traceability is becoming clear. While
there is a natural hierarchy found in the calibration
ecosystem, with a clear order of entities to which
calibration and measurement information flows, it
is unclear as how to best logically order actors in
the connected world. In our research, we propose a
mechanism that successfully establishes traceability
chains, to ensure we can maintain valid calibration
and rapidly attend to errors that may persist in
high-assurance activities. Furthermore, we show that
blockchains can provide a highly available tamper-
resistant chain of evidence, which we can rely on
in the event of catastrophe. Ultimately, we note
that safety assurance relate to security, as much as
managing stochastic interference, when we consider
high assurance IoT to be connected.
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